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In 2006, Stephen Tower was 49 and an endurance cyclist, and a poster child patient for a 
metal on metal (MoM) hip resurfacing (ASR).  As an orthopedic surgeon himself he careful 
chose the particular device and surgeon for his procedure.  However, by the spring of 2007, one 
year after the ASR, all was not well with his hip. There was pain after long bike rides, difficulties 
exercising at altitude, balance issues resulting in falls and bike crashes, and a blood cobalt level 
was 40 times the Biologic Exposure Index (BET).  A “normal” blood cobalt level is 0.2 parts per 
billion (ppb). Parts per billion and micrograms per liter (mcg/L) units are interchangeable.  One 
year post ASR, Tower’s level of 40 ppb was 200 times normal. 
Six months later Tower was transiently disabled by a “mood disorder not otherwise 
specified.” This problem came on coincidently with tinnitus, mild deafness, spatial disorientation 
and sleep apnea; he needed a CPAP machine at night, was breathless with minimal exercise, and 
was requiring multiple medications and weekly counseling to manage his “mood disorder.” 
Several months later, he discovered a new tremor and a lack of coordination in his non-dominant 
right hand.   Due to his hip pain and disfunction alone, it was clear by November 2009 that the 
ASR needed to be redone. 
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When his surgeon placed the spinal needle for his revision anesthetic in November of 
2009 he collected some fluid.  Tower’s CSF cobalt level was the third highest ever published 
(Tower 2010). The others on the podium were deaf, blind, and in all likelihood dumb. (Steens, et 
al 2006).  His revision surgeon found an untended crankcase of metallic sludge about the ASR 
and wear of one sector of the socketing 100 times that which was expected. Tower had lost the 
ligaments that hold a hip reduced because of Adverse Local Tissue Reactions to Metallosis 
(ALTRM), a problem that would result in nine dislocations of his otherwise well functioning 
ceramic-plastic revision hip. 
  After the removal of his MoM hip, Tower’s mood disorder, tremor, vision problems and 
other symptoms disappeared.  At this point, Tower’s suspicions that cobaltism from his MoM hip 
had been the cause of neurological disorder seemed confirmed and he set out to add this 
information to the discourse on MoM hip complications.  His resolve hardened when he revised 
the only patient that he had implanted with an ASR. His cobalt levels had peaked at 25 times the 
BET and he had developed all of Tower’s maladies to a lesser degree. Now Tower had a series 
..... case after case.  
The manuscript of the “series” submitted to the American Journal of Bone and Joint 
Surgery was not warmly received at first. The three anonymous “peers” were split as to its merit 
and the adult reconstruction subsection editor was a consultant for DePuy, the manufacturer of 
the ASR. The paper seemed fated to a death by a thousand resubmissions until a direct appeal 
was made to the editor in chief, a pediatric orthopedic surgeon without financial interests in the 
ASR. He allowed Tower to replace edited content; and the delay in publication also allowed for 
the inclusion of an independent laboratory’s analysis of Tower’s explant. The report was 
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published online in October of 2010, three months after the ASR’s formal recall (Tower, 2010). 
It was submitted in March or April. 
Its publication was accompanied by a commissioned commentary by a Vice President of 
the American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons (AAOS), Dr. Joshua Jacobs. This is an unusual, 
perhaps unprecedented, for the governance of the AAOS to be involved in critiquing a scientific 
paper.  Jacobs’ work partially underpinned the reintroduction of the metal-metal hips and was 
largely done on via industry funding and consultancy fees rather than through royalties on a 
specific implant. At the time of the commentary Dr. Jacob’s declared conflict of interest (COI) 
included consultancies and stock options with multiple companies involved in the development 
and marketing of the MoM hips and financial support of his lab. Dr. Jacobs contended that 
arthroprosthetic cobaltism from a MoM hip was likely extraordinarily rare because about a 
million had been implanted and Tower’s report was the first published. (Jacobs, 2010)  
Shortly after the paper and Dr. Jacobs commentary were published an AAOS sponsored a 
Webinar addressing the complications of MoM hips was held. The surgeons that organized the 
event and the surgeons on the panel all had notable MoM hip COI’s. One was Dr. Jacobs, 
another Dr. Schmalzried (the design surgeon of the ASR), and the third was Dr. Cuckler who 
was an advocate for Biomet’s MoM’s hip products. (Cuckler, 2005) The program focused on the 
periprosthetic complications of chrome-cobalt metallosis that were being increasingly recognized 
and largely dismissed cobaltism as being a realistic concern. During the mandatory disclosure of 
potential COI’s the surgeon panelists noted that they were industry consultants and received 
royalty payments for the sales of MoM hip implants but these relationships had no bearing on the 
topic being addressed. 
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It took the good offices of Senator Begich to obtain a contact for Tower within the FDA. 
Dr. Yustein explained to Tower that he was unqualified to be “expert” in the FDA’s eyes 
because he did not consult for industry and he had not been forwarded to the FDA by the AAOS 
as an expert. The means by which the metal-metal hips got through the FDAs abbreviated and 
expanded pre-market approval process was now apparent.  When he reported back to Senator 
Begich that the FDA relied on entirely industry for “expert” opinion about the safety and 
efficacy of MoM hip replacements he responded that his office could not get involved in 
“scientific” disputes. 
Tower was determined to get the word out at the 2013 meeting of the AAOS. He 
submitted three scientific papers, one Instructional Course Lecture (ICL) proposal, and one 
Symposium proposal, all addressing metal-metal hip complications. It was about 100 hours of 
work, mainly to contact candidates to be on the panels for the symposium and the ICL.   He 
eventually assembled a world class faculty without significant COIs. Everything was turned 
down by the hip program committee. Three quarters of member of this panel had declared COI 
with arthroprosthetic companies with a stake in MoM hips. The selected panel for the 
symposium was largely a repeat of the previous year including Dr. Schmalzried and Dr. Jacobs. 
The moderator was Dr. Lombardi, a Biomet design surgeon and former metal-metal advocate. 
He was also the President of the Hip Society and the chairperson of the hip program committee 
that had rejected Tower’s five submissions.  
Several months ago a European researcher that Tower met at the 2012 AAOS meeting 
requested that he review her manuscript on the systematic survey of their 600 hip resurfacing 
patients for the symptoms of cobaltism. It was a large undertaking and a surprising one given 
that her center had hitched its star to hip resurfacing. They found that patients with blood cobalt 
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levels of > 10 mcg/L experienced mood, cognitive, and sleep disorders at a rate greater than 
those with lower levels. Once cobalt levels were above 20 mcg/L these problems became 
frequent. Although tinnitus and deafness were common presentations of cobaltism these 
symptoms were not as specific as mood instability, cognitive changes, and disordered sleep as 
sentinel symptoms of cobaltism because tinnitus and deafness are so common in the arthritic 
population. The manuscript noted that they had confirmed the diagnosis of cobaltism in 4 of their 
patients, only one of these patients was the subject of a prior publication (Van Der Straeten, et al 
2006).  
The manuscript was submitted to Clinical Orthopedics and Related Research (CORR). 
There have been about a hundred publications in CORR relating to metal-metal hip technology. 
Those papers published before 2008 are generally favorable to the technology, were written by a 
cabal of surgeons vested in the technology, industry funded, and the peer review of these papers 
was likely done by surgeons with similar COI as the authors. Tower gave the European paper his 
highest recommendation. The other three reviewers were contrary, as was the editor. The paper 
was rejected without an option for revision. The fundamental cited flaw in the paper was that it 
did not include a control group. 
Tower then wrote a letter to the editor of CORR pointing out that few if any of the 
approximate 80 papers published in CORR that supported metal-metal hips contained control 
groups and that most of the 600 patients in the European study had blood cobalt levels of < 5 
mcg/L and that this group was an acceptable control.  He requested that CORR provide him with 
the declared COI of the three reviewers.  The editor was offended—and argued that Tower’s 
request violated the spirit of blind peer review.  Indeed, CORR does not so much as have its peer 
reviewers submit disclosures of potential SICOI!  The paper remains unpublished today. 
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Dr. Tower’s struggle highlights the ways in which mutually reinforcing structures of 
power, especially within medical specialties, can render claims of conflicts of interest 
meaningless.  We use Dr. Turner’s case to illustrate the way in which the integration of 
medicine-as-science and medicine-as-industry (what we shall term, following Habermas (1984), 
the “colonization” of medicine) deprives members within and outside of a professional 
community of a frame of reference from which claims of epistemic authority can be fairly and 
accurately adjudicated.  In such a context, the reliability of a speaker’s claims is judged almost 
exclusively in terms of the credibility of the speaker, whereas the validity of the speaker’s truth-
claims go unexamined.  In medicine, as in the sciences generally, the credibility of the speakers 
is often generated through the authority of “expertise.”  However, in colonized medicine, 
expertise is increasingly defined in industrial terms in which significant techno-industrial success 
becomes the hallmark of expertise.  The industrialization of medical expertise creates a 
methodological paradox in scientific inquiry: those who have the most expertise (and thus guide 
the inquiry) are those who are least likely to be objective.  We argue for a more inclusive and 
normative account of expertise that emphasizes both technical achievement and the virtue of 
impartiality. 
The Colonization of Medical Discourse 
Medical inquiry, like all scientific inquiry, is essentially a discursive practice as it involves the 
development and evaluation of truth claims between speakers.  As rooted in the evaluation of 
truth claims, such a discourse, to be rational, must be guided by norms and procedures by which 
speakers offer justifications for their claims based on the forceless force of the better argument 
oriented towards a consensus of fellow discursive partners.  These norms include transparency, 
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publicity of evidence, appeal to the best explanation, freedom from coercion, and a commitment 
from speakers that they speak truthfully, sincerely and that they evaluate the claims of others 
impartially.  When properly proceduralized and institutionalized, such discourses reflect the 
“communicative rationality” that is at the heart of discursive legitimacy for modern, pluralistic 
and post-conventional societies (Habermas, 1984, 1986, 2000). 
Scientific discourse, like many specialized sub-discourses in society, differs from moral 
and political discourse in that while it is in principle public and open to all, the knowledge and 
skill requirements for rational and informed evaluation of truth-claims requires that those with 
specific training, skills and experience assume an authorized status in the discourse.  While the 
role of authority has been the grist of many postmodern critics of science, when properly 
constructed the use of authority in a truth-oriented discourse is by no means an epistemological 
barrier.  By limiting, and to some degree privileging “uptake” to those speakers who have the 
requisite skill sets to adequately evaluate scientific truth-claims, discourses in the sciences are 
better able to sort out the “signal versus noise” problem that plaques more open discourses such 
as the discourses on morality, aesthetics and politics.  Moreover, the use of experts is often a 
reliable source of knowledge production and informed evaluation within and at the borders of 
scientific discourse.  Journal editors rely on experts in a particular field to review the importance 
and scientific validity of manuscript submissions; conference organizers rely on peer-experts in 
the same way.  Through peer review at the journal and conference level, as well as through 
academic appointments, expertise plays a significant gate-keeping role in the flow of information 
within the discourse.  Likewise, experts play an essential role in advising laypersons on the best 
science of the day.  Regulators, policy-makers, judges, juries, journalists and even bioethicists 
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routinely rely on scientific experts for an informed evaluation of the current state of scientific 
knowledge (Goldman, 1999). 
Again, our view is that when properly structured, reliance on experts is a reliable veritisistic 
practice.  Experts are often in the best epistemological position to generate true claims and to 
evaluate the truth-claims of other speakers in the discourse.  However, the use of expertise in 
scientific discourse creates a delicate balance between authorization and exclusion.  When 
rational, authorization in scientific discourse improves the quality of inquiry.  However, when 
corrupted, authorization in scientific discourse can become a mechanism for marginalization of 
relevant speakers, arguments, evidence and perspectives.  In this latter case (and these are the 
cases that critics of scientific discourse focus on) the use of authority in science undermines the 
rational legitimacy of the discourse and degrades the epistemic quality of the inquiry.  Our view 
is that Dr. Tower’s case illustrates that various structural changes to the medical discourse has 
created a skewed model of expertise.  These changes we term the “colonization” of medical 
discourse. 
In modern societies, veritistic discourses structured around communicative rationality are 
by no means exclusive.  In economic, bureaucratic and to some degree legal discourses, open 
consensus-seeking forms of communication are complemented, or entirely replaced by, what 
Max Weber called zweckrationalität—instrumental or strategic rationality based on the 
application of administrative or bureaucratic power (Weber, 1905). In the context of many social 
systems, rationality is constrained to efficiency calculations based on given ends that themselves 
are not subject to evaluation.  In bureaucratic contexts for example, claims between speakers are 
often not aimed at consensus via the forceless force of the better argument, but resemble instead 
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commands issued from superiors to subordinates based on strategic calculations of the 
imperatives of the organization.    
The distinction between communicative and instrumental rationality is an analytic as 
opposed to an empirical distinction.   Real flesh and blood forms of social organization always 
have elements of both communicative and instrumental reasoning.  Bureaucracies have 
numerous levels of discourse in which individuals exchange reasons about truth claims aimed at 
rational consensus.  Likewise, scientific discourse would be impossible without the efficient use 
of institutions and resources that make the meaningful exchange of ideas possible.  However, 
there are also important differences between various kinds of discourses.  Because some 
discourses (science, morality and politics) are truth-oriented discourses, the use of strategic 
rationality and administration power in those discourses must, if the discourse is to be legitimate, 
be steered by communicative rationality and communicative power.  When a truth-oriented 
discourse comes to be steered by strategic rationality and administrative power, that discourse 
has become colonized. 
A colonized truth-oriented discourse is one that relies on a superficial commitment to 
procedures and institutions that concretize communicative rationality, however, the operation of 
those procedures and institutions are actually steered by strategic rationality in services of the 
steering mechanisms of money and/or administrative power.  What makes such a discourse 
colonized is that the effects of communicative rationality (communicative power via rational 
legitimacy) is harvested while the substantive commitment to communicative rationality is 
disposed.  The result is a discourse that is no longer truth-oriented, but enjoys the social power 
and influence of one that is.   
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Our view is that medical discourse in the United States, especially in specific subfields 
such as pharmacology and orthopedics, have become increasingly colonized by instrumental 
rationality and administrative power in the service of economic interests.  Medical discourse in 
the United States has always involved a certain measure of partnership between science and 
industry.  In a free market society, most therapies are ultimately made available to patients 
through market mechanisms—the research, development, production and distribution of health 
care resources via private, for profit, enterprises.  However, a shift has occurred over the last 
generation in which industry support and influence has increased dramatically (IOM, 2009). 
There are various reasons for this including, and perhaps especially, the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act 
which allowed institutions to patent discoveries that resulted from federal research (before that 
time the federal government would hold such patents).  Institutions, such as universities, were 
then able to collect licensing and royalty fees by licensing other entities (i.e. industry) to develop 
those discoveries.  The Bayh-Dole Act, and other developments in biotechnology, led to a 
significant increase in the funding of research by industry (Schacht, 2008)   In 1977, industrial 
funding counted for 29% of support for clinical and non-clinical research in the United States 
(Read and Campbell, 1988).  By 1989 that proportion had grown to 45%, and by 1995 is had 
swelled to approximately 60% (IOM 2009).   Today industry is the largest source of funding for 
biomedical research in the United States.  Likewise, a 2006 survey of medical schools and 
teaching hospitals found that 67% of academic departments had relationships with industry 
(Campbell, et al 2007) and a 1998 survey found that 43% of academic scientists the most 
research intensive universities received research related gifts from industry.  66% of those 
scientists believed those gifts were “important” to their research. (IOM, 2009). 
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The transition from what we call “public” medicine to “industrial” medicine has 
numerous advantages and has proven to be beneficial in many ways for scientists, industry and 
consumers.  For instance, academic researchers with industry ties are more likely to be involved 
in start-up companies, more likely to have patents, and more likely to have products on the 
market.  Importantly they also tend to publish more articles in peer-reviewed journals than their 
peers who lacked industry relations (IOM, 2009). 
However, there are important ways in which industrial medicine skews medical discourse 
because speakers in the discourse are increasingly guided by economic imperatives and 
administrative power.  Scientists in the life science are more likely to have their work result in 
“trade secrets” which will not be shared with other speakers of the discourse for study and 
evaluation.  Academic researchers with industry ties are also more likely to delay publication of 
scientific discoveries to allow for their antecedent commercialization.  Academic researchers 
with industry ties are more likely to rely on data analysis provided by industry statisticians and 
lack full access to all the data of the study.  Studies funded by industry are much more likely to 
support industry products; and studies that do not are much more likely to go unpublished.  Some 
studies have found that researchers with industry funding suffer from significant confirmation 
bias of industrial products.  This bias includes reaching conclusions favorable to industry even 
when such conclusions are not supported by evidence and “scrubbing” published studies so that 
they appear more favorable to industry. (IOM, 2009; Beauchamp, 1992) 
As medical discourse devolves into an economic discourse, “expertise” becomes 
increasingly reliant on technical and economic achievement and becomes detached from its 
normative underpinnings within veratistic discourse.  Expertise within “industrial medicine” is 
defined according the achievement of particular instrumental goods-- patents, grants and 
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contracts are constitutive of expertise on this model.  To be an expert is to achieve these self-
perpetuating ends, where the interests of the expert, university or company are served by 
isolating knowledge and increasingly making one’s self indispensible in the search for medical 
knowledge.  To be an expert is to make the aggregation of knowledge possible.  An expert 
gathers the tools of knowledge, stamps them with a particular identity, and controls how 
knowledge will flow, to a lesser or increasingly greater degree, from that moment forward.  
Control, power and recognition are the essence of expertise in “industrial medicine.”  
Truth and problem-solving are not irrelevant on this model of expertise. It could be 
countered that even if expertise in “industrial medicine” afford certain kinds of power, that 
power is earned through observable test results within medical science.  The right to a patent is 
grounded in the ability to demonstrate that one has made a truly novel product or improvement. 
The patent must be able to resist challenges which sometimes turn on shared agreement about the 
worth the things patented.  Surely, this is a kind of truth.   Scientific papers in medicine – as long 
as they are not based on falsified results or the use of deceptive practices – often depend for their 
legitimacy on reproducible results and their explanatory power for scientific problems. Practical 
results are not inconsequential in medicine. Are patients actually healed or helped by a particular 
drug or treatment?  The degree of improvement or harm to patients can be theoretically measured 
and used to hold certain players in industrial medicine accountable.  Lawsuits involving the drug 
Vioxx and others can be used as examples. It is in the best interests of scientists, doctors and 
companies alike to create products that work.  It is only reasonable, then, for expertise to map 
closely onto those who solve problems and produce positive results with which most can agree. 
Unfortunately, this conclusion does not necessarily follow.  
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It is critical that experts appear to be centrally engaged in the search for medical truth. 
This, at least, is clear. By in large, the public trusts that medical science works in its best 
interests.  The trust they feel is an extension of trust assumed in the doctor-patient relationship. 
After all, many medical researchers are clinicians as well.  It is natural for the trust regarding one 
role (physician) to be transferred to a larger role (physician-researcher). Impartiality is the 
foundation of science in the West. Even for those who believe that the elimination of all human 
bias is impossible, the core virtues of the scientist defined around objective veritistic inquiry. We 
expect impartiality to be the driving motivation behind medical science. Expertise in medicine 
science is expected to embody excellence in the search for impartiality. It must appear this way 
to retain legitimacy in the larger, public system.  
Dr. Tower’s case highlights the paradoxical nature of expertise in “industrial medicine”.  
The gate-keeping function of expertise—when detached from the objectivity that is the 
normative heart of vertisitic discourse—grants experts extraordinary influence in scientific 
discourse such that certain lines of inquiry—those critical of industry—are effectively 
marginalized.  In their gate-keeping function within medical discourse, experts are strategically 
placed as journal peer reviewers, conference organizers and review boards, IRB boards 
members, and consultants for regulators.  Again it is not unreasonable to rely on experts for these 
roles, however, in colonized medical discourse the concept of expertise has become dangerously 
detached from its normative underpinnings.  Those most likely to produce the products that 
“baptize” one an expert—journal articles, patents, and products on market—are precisely those 
also most likely to suffer from substantial conflicts of interest and the potential (and real) lose of 
impartiality.   
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In the case of Dr. Tower’s efforts to explore the dangers of cobaltism in MoM hips one 
sees how FDA, for instance, relies on experts on MoM hip replacements and resurfacing to 
assess the safety and efficacy of that product—however, many of the experts in this field have 
significant, and lucrative, ties the very products they are evaluating.  Likewise, in Tower’s 
experience at AAOS 2013, the majority of a review panel selecting papers on MoM hip devices 
had similar ties to industry.  The result—an entire slate of papers that supported the safety and 
efficacy of metal on metal hip replacements—and the exclusion of several papers critical of the 
product.  Consider also the rejection by Clinical Orthopaedics and Related Research of the study 
on cobalt toxicity of MOM hips because the study lacked a control group.  The same journal has 
published over fifty studies supporting the safety and efficacy of MOM hips despite the lack of a 
control group.   Whether this last outcome was the result of conflict of interest is unclear because 
the journal does not even ask for disclosures from peer reviewers and thus makes no effort to 
screen out those with significant conflicts of interest. 
The broad tolerance of, if not indifference to, conflicts of interest on the part of the 
experts in industrial medicine undermines the legitimacy of medical discourse.  A veratisitc 
discourse can count as legitimate only to the degree that the truth claims of speakers can be made 
available to other speakers for impartial evaluation.  In complex discourses this requires 
procedures and institutions that standardize and guarantee speaker access to other speakers and 
to the impartial evaluation of their truth claims.  Typically, procedures such as blind and 
confidential peer review have typically been seen as providing such a guarantee (Goldman, 
1999).  However, as expertise in various fields of medicine becomes increasingly conflicted, 
certainly the appearance, if not the very practice of the scientific discourse becomes corrupted. 
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A NORMATIVE MODEL OF EXPERTISE 
Our view is that the cobalt toxicity of MOM hips highlights a structural shift in the way 
medical discourse is conducted.  The role of industry in medical research, particularly in 
orthopedic medicine, is greater than ever and has given rise to a model of expertise in which 
technical and academic achievement has become detached from impartiality and objectivity.  In 
light of this, numerous critics in Science and Technology Studies and elsewhere have argued for 
the abandonment of the idea of expertise and the embracing of a “technological popularism” 
(Collins, 1997; Fuller 1993; ).  We do not accept this view.  Even in its compromised state, 
expertise in medical discourse has proven to be conducive to research and rapid advancement in 
therapies for patients (IOM 2009; Beauchamp 1992).  We propose addressing the problems in 
the current model of expertise by arguing for a normative dimension of expertise.  As key 
members of a veritistic discourse who are entrusted by members of the discourse, as well as by 
regulators, policy makers and the public at large, an “expert” is not merely a person with 
sophisticated knowledge and skill sets, but is also a person who participates in discourse in an 
impartial and objective manner.  Understood normatively, the kind of expertise that should be 
sought out within medical discourse should take into account the conflicts of interest that a 
particular expert-candidate faces.  By “conflict of interest” we mean: A set of circumstances that 
would lead a reasonable observer to conclude that there is a substantial risk that the duties of 
the professional will not be honored due to the professional’s unique self-interest (e.g. economic 
incentive, reputation). 
Of course, someone with a conflict of interest might well be able to be impartial 
(Beauchamp, 1992; Davis 1982, 1993).  However, just as published articles and patents are a 
marker of, and not constitutive of, expertise so too is the status of an expert-candidate’s conflicts 
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of interest.  Operating under conflicts of interest is a marker of an increased probability of bias 
and thus a decrease in one’s expertise, whereas operating free from such conflicts, all things 
being equal, is a marker of impartiality and thus the presence of at least one element of expertise.  
Table 1 illustrates an index of expertise: 
 
Table 1: Index of Expertise 
 High (10-7) Medium (6-3) Low (3-0) 






patents and devices on 
market 
Average number of 
journal articles, 








Normative Expertise Few if any markers of 
bias or partiality;  
Personal 
circumstances are 
such that there is 
some to moderate 




of interest; key 
financial gain at stake; 
key professional 
reputation at stake;  
Total Expertise Total score from both technical and normative expertise.  20-14= high 
expertise; 13-6=moderate expertise; 5-0= low expertise 
 
Regulators, journal editors and conference organizers should seek out the best experts 
available.  However, on this index of expertise the composition of those experts should change 
from the usual suspects. In industrialized medicine, “experts” rank highly on technical expertise 
but many rank rather lowly on normative expertise.  On our view, this diminishes their total 
expertise and would make many of them moderate experts at best.  Meanwhile, many “rank and 
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file” members of medical discourse, such as Dr. Tower, would rate significantly higher on our 
index of expertise compared to a technical model alone.   
Dr. Tower’s commitment to the practices of impartiality gives him a fundamental claim 
to normative expertise.  While bias and conflicts of interest signal a block to impartiality, 
transparency, openness, and the scientific pursuit and evaluation of data are definitive of 
impartiality and normative expertise. We see ample evidence of this pursuit in Dr. Tower’s work.  
With very little professional and institutional support, Dr. Tower rigorously documented the 
symptoms that he and a number of his patients experienced after receiving metal-metal hip 
implantations. On his own time, Dr. Tower meticulously created a database of objectifiable 
elements describing their cases. He developed a methodology for capturing and comparing what 
could be very interior and personalized experiences – including feelings of depression – into data 
point that could be known and analyzed by others.  Blood tests confirmed or disconfirmed the 
presence of heavy metals in patients. Key indicators of inflammation were monitored.   Magnetic 
imaging, and for some, surgical interventions documented the tragic destruction of hip tissue 
around the metal-metal implants.  Dr. Tower’s data was gathered according to the widely-shared 
rules of scientific inquiry.  
Dr. Tower’s work represents true normative expertise in that he has deliberately engaged 
with his colleagues as rational agents by presenting them with the data and requesting an open 
dialog about the harms he has documented. By relying on data, Dr. Tower makes use of a mode 
of investigation that is open to any rational agent with the knowledge and resources to test the 
data.   Anyone can gather data and judge the matter for themselves.  Anyone with the proper 
resources can attempt to confirm or disconfirm his hypotheses with their own valid tools and 
methods.  Dr. Tower encourages his colleagues to do so.  He has vigorously advocated for 
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greater testing of patients with metal-metal implants so heavy-metal blood levels can be 
publically tracked and correlated with problematic implants.   
Dr. Tower has worked to share his data on a number of fronts, including repeated – and 
sometimes successful – attempts to publish and present his data on the national level. He has also 
been a fierce supporter of a national database for where data about the success and failure of 
implants could be collected and shared on a national level, and results would be shared with the 
surgeons who performed the original work. This kind of feedback, done with the proper respect 
for confidentiality, makes knowledge in this area possible. The data could exist and trends could 
be studied.  
Dr. Tower’s method here is in sharp contrast to those in the orthopedic leadership who 
have flatly rejected his attempts to rally the base and encourage his colleagues to gather more 
data for themselves.  Here, Dr. Tower’s claim is simply for his colleagues to recommend blood 
or other tests of their patients with metal-metal hip replacements to document whether or not 
damage exists.  The leaders in his field have blocked this attempt by both limiting Dr. Tower’s 
official conference appearances, limited his publications on this topic, and simply not advocating 
for the simple gathering of data themselves. His professional leaders and experts do not try to 
respond to the data that exists.  They limit investigations and debate, and who can participate in 
the debate, rather than further the discussion.  At this time, a national database tracking the 
success and failures of orthopedic implants does not exist in the U.S.  The AAOS, Dr. Tower’s 
professional society, shows little enthusiasm for the project.  
Importantly, normative expertise is not a measure of the truth of one’s data or hypotheses. 
Normative expertise is truth-conductive—especially if we take a long term view of knowledge 
 19 
production: the features of normative expertise are ones that likely reveal the truth in a process of 
inquiry.  This is a measure of a researcher’s excellence as a participant in the veratisitc 
discourses, and those are the practices of impartiality. It is possible that Dr. Tower’s hypotheses 
regarding the causal links between metal-metal hip replacements and systematic consequences in 
many patients are wrong.  That is less and less likely in many cases, but regardless, normative 
expertise captures the virtues underlying the pursuit of science, namely, impartiality. Such 
virtues will often lead to the truth, but not always.  
It is reasonable to consider Dr. Tower’s own personal bias in investigating the metal-
metal hip implants.  It is undeniable that Dr. Tower was initially motivated by his own negative 
experience with the implants. Even now, the ferocity with which he presses the AAOS to 
account for his data speaks of a more personal driving force. Surely, he has not sacrificed so 
much for the intrinsic value of scientific knowledge.  Perhaps his personal experiences bias him 
to search for experimental correlations where none exist.  Should his personal bias detract from 
his normative expertise?   
Personal ties – even ones that are laudable in their own right – are potential impediments 
to impartial inquiry and more work should be done to distinguish between different levels of bias 
and how they threaten and erode normative expertise.  To Dr. Tower’s credit, he has been 
thoroughly forthcoming about the role his own experiences have played in his research.   There 
is no attempt to hide this link. Whether due to an illness in one’s self or one’s family, personal 
motivations have a long history of inspiring progress in medical research. There are undoubtedly 
important differences in how personal motivations to seek justice or understanding through 
research effect an enterprise and how stock holdings, faculty positions, and other conflicts of 
interest effect researchers.  Nevertheless, such personal bias may be grounds for having slightly 
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less confidence in Dr. Tower’s normative expertise.  Greater importance, then, is placed on his 
participation in the practices of impartiality. Dr. Tower’s rigorous collection of data and attempt 
to subject his data to wide-spread critical evaluation places him in excellent standing.  His data in 
addition to other independent studies of problems with metal-metal implants makes any 
dismissal of Dr. Tower’s research due to personal bias unconscionable.  
Normative expertise implies a dedication to data, transparency and impartiality in 
method, and actions that further inquiry and knowledge.  Scientists commit themselves to the 
norms of a veratisitc discourse, and hence, participate in the kinds of practices that constitute 
impartiality. On one hand, this commitment is simply one of the constraints of the discourse 
behind science and medicine.  Conflicts of interest that erode researchers’ impartiality violate the 
norms of the discourse on which they depend as professionals.  On the other hand, the normative 
pull of impartiality exists for scientists because they must seek and gain trust from one another 
and the public in pursuing their professional aims.  
As mentioned earlier, many medical experts are also clinical providers.  They request 
trust in nearly every facet of patient care.  The wide differential of knowledge and experience 
between provider and patient places the patient in a particular position of vulnerability, the 
provider asks for trust even from a seasoned member of the medical community who assumes 
the role of the patient.  In return for the patient’s trust, the provider will respect her autonomy 
and care for her best interests.  Respect for confidentiality and patient autonomy more generally 
are often approaches to medical care, rather than explicit contracts between provider and patient. 
In hundreds of ways, the provider assures the patient that the provider will govern herself 
according to the norms of ethical patient medical care. Patients divulge some of the most 
personal features of their lives, sometimes consent to care that will occur while the patient is 
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unconscious, and follow the advice of their providers, all on the assumption that the provider 
abides by this covenant between them. Medicine would be impossible without trust.   
By failing to properly account for conflict of interest, industrial medicine violates the 
trust of patients and other members of the public on which it depends.  The public buys medical 
products – or allows them to be prescribed for them – believing that the process by which the 
product is authorized is a scientifically valid one that looks after the patient’s interests.  They 
believe the experts who participate in this process primarily conduct themselves according to the 
norms of impartial inquiry. They must trust this process.  The level of expertise required to 
evaluate the product is beyond most members of the public.  Even if they have the expertise, 
experimental trials require a system that few have the time and resources to organize.  Here, 
financial transactions are part of the medical system, but even financial exchanges depend on a 
series of expectations about processes that validate the worth of the product.  To have a 
provider’s seal of approval is usually reassuring, due again to relationships of trust.  
In many cases, providers are also asked to trust that the proper protocols – including fair 
and accurate trials, assessments by numerous boards of review, and FDA approval – are honestly 
conducted and fairly reported. Most providers believe that conflicts of interest exist in medicine, 
but they must believe conflicts do not change the essence of this process.  Providers’ initial 
requests of trust from patients depend on their truthful assessment of this process. Providers 
cannot, without violating their relationship with patients, recommend a product that they believe 
is not honestly tested and validated.  They cannot simply prescribe a drug, hoping that the 
fundamentally conflicted system for drug testing produced a workable, useful product in the end.  
This is not the agreement between provider and patient.  This is not the agreement between the 
public and its medical regulatory boards.    
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Conclusion 
The case of cobaltism in MoM hips highlights the ways in which the procedures of the 
veritistic discourse of medicine can be colonized to serve economic imperatives.  In our view, a 
key element of this colonization is the technical model of expertise that, in industrialized 
medicine, creates a feedback loop from economic power, research, regulation, and back to 
economic power.  We counter this trend by proposing a normative model of expertise and an 
index of expertise that values both the technical and normative dimensions of good scientific 
discoursive practice.  Properly accounting for normative expertise is an essential part of living up 
to the covenants that make medicine, even industrialized medicine, possible.   Such a model of 
expertise should create more room for “rank and file” members of the discourse because of their 
relative lack of industry relationships.  We propose the index of expertise as a guide for key 
members of the discourse (e.g. journal editors and conference organizers) in selecting experts for 
peer review.  The model should also be useful for those at the edges of the discourse (e.g. 
regulators, journalists, ethicists and critics) for seeking out the kind of expertise that best grounds 
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